Files
hyprcrd/relay/inc/routes/collab-locks.php
T
thandClaude Opus 4.7 d83de30d6d security: v2.0 — AES-GCM crypto, SSRF guards, rate limits, hardening
Breaking wire-format change: dual-read (V1+V2) / single-write (V2) so
existing user secrets, stored messages, and inter-tenant key keep
working. Old clients and relays lose cross-version chat until both
sides are upgraded.

Relay
- Switch clientEncrypt/masterEncrypt to AES-256-GCM with HKDF-derived
  per-ciphertext salts; keep CBC-V1 fallback on decrypt only.
- On-bootstrap migration re-envelopes tenant secret_encrypted and the
  inter-tenant key to GCM-V2 (idempotent).
- CORS: stop reflecting arbitrary Origin; allow own origin + optional
  RELAY_CORS_ORIGINS env allowlist; drop Access-Control-Allow-Credentials.
- Generic error messages replace "no such user: <name>" enumeration.
- Exception messages no longer echoed back; logged server-side.
- Collab-lock max hold capped at 10min so a member can't grief-refresh
  forever.
- Attachment filenames validated against hex.<ext> pattern.
- Passwords min length 10; /api/account/password rate-limited.

App / Electron client
- Shared hyprcrdRelayEncrypt/Decrypt helpers (GCM-V2 write, V1 read).
- Chat + collab-buckets plugins delegate to the shared helpers.
- Poll + push + attachments migrated to the dual-format path.
- /api/relay/settings GET returns has_key boolean; secret never echoed.
- Setup endpoint now CSRF-checked.
- SSRF: CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS restricted to HTTP(S) everywhere; bookmarks
  favicon fetch also blocks private/loopback/link-local.
- Login / password-change rate limiter moved to DB-backed IP keying.
- Passwords min length 10 throughout.
- Zip import enforces per-file (25MB) and total (500MB) caps, extension
  allowlist, no-overwrite.
- Verbose relay-push debug gated behind APP_DEBUG env.

Version bumped to 2.0.0 (protocol-breaking).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 17:02:04 +02:00

111 lines
5.9 KiB
PHP

<?php
// Collab card lock routes (Phase 4 — advisory edit locks):
// POST /api/collab-locks acquire/refresh a lock
// DELETE /api/collab-locks/{bucket}/{card} release own lock
// GET /api/collab-locks list locks visible to caller
//
// Membership is enforced on every operation. A lock refresh just extends
// the TTL (60 seconds from now). Expired rows are pruned on every request
// via bootstrap.php cleanup, so the GET list never contains stale locks.
if (!defined('RELAY_BOOTSTRAPPED')) { http_response_code(404); exit; }
$clientTenant = $clientTenant ?? authClient($db);
function collabLocksIsMember(PDO $db, string $bucketUid, int $tenantId): bool {
$stmt = $db->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM collab_bucket_members WHERE bucket_uid = :b AND tenant_id = :t');
$stmt->execute(['b' => $bucketUid, 't' => $tenantId]);
return (bool)$stmt->fetchColumn();
}
// ── POST: acquire/refresh ────────────────────────────────────────
// Maximum time a single holder can keep refreshing the same lock. Without a
// cap a malicious member could heartbeat forever, blocking every other
// member's writes. 10 minutes is long enough for any real edit session and
// short enough to time-box grief. When the cap is hit the lock is force-
// released and the client must re-acquire — giving everyone else a window.
const COLLAB_LOCK_MAX_HOLD_SECONDS = 600;
if ($route === '/api/collab-locks' && $method === 'POST') {
if (!$clientTenant) jsonResponse(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
if (isRateLimited($db, 'collab-locks-post', 240)) jsonResponse(['error' => 'rate limited'], 429);
$input = json_decode(file_get_contents('php://input'), true) ?: [];
$bucketUid = trim((string)($input['bucket_uid'] ?? ''));
$cardUid = trim((string)($input['card_uid'] ?? ''));
if ($bucketUid === '' || $cardUid === '') jsonResponse(['error' => 'bucket_uid and card_uid required'], 400);
if (!collabLocksIsMember($db, $bucketUid, (int)$clientTenant['id'])) {
jsonResponse(['error' => 'not a member of this bucket'], 403);
}
// Drop expired before checking — bootstrap cleanup runs every request
// but this protects against a stale lock blocking acquisition in the
// narrow window between cleanup and this query.
$db->prepare("DELETE FROM collab_card_locks WHERE bucket_uid = :b AND card_uid = :c AND expires_at <= datetime('now')")
->execute(['b' => $bucketUid, 'c' => $cardUid]);
// Also drop locks that have been refreshed past the max hold window —
// cap enforcement for grief prevention.
$db->prepare("DELETE FROM collab_card_locks WHERE bucket_uid = :b AND card_uid = :c AND acquired_at <= datetime('now', '-" . COLLAB_LOCK_MAX_HOLD_SECONDS . " seconds')")
->execute(['b' => $bucketUid, 'c' => $cardUid]);
// Existing live lock? If a different tenant holds it, refuse.
$cur = $db->prepare('SELECT holder_id, holder_username, expires_at, acquired_at FROM collab_card_locks WHERE bucket_uid = :b AND card_uid = :c');
$cur->execute(['b' => $bucketUid, 'c' => $cardUid]);
$existing = $cur->fetch();
if ($existing && (int)$existing['holder_id'] !== (int)$clientTenant['id']) {
jsonResponse([
'error' => 'card is being edited by ' . $existing['holder_username'],
'locked_by' => $existing['holder_username'],
'locked_by_id' => (int)$existing['holder_id'],
'expires_at' => $existing['expires_at'],
], 409);
}
// Acquire / refresh — same holder bumps the expiry
$db->prepare("
INSERT INTO collab_card_locks (bucket_uid, card_uid, holder_id, holder_username, acquired_at, expires_at)
VALUES (:b, :c, :hid, :hu, datetime('now'), datetime('now', '+60 seconds'))
ON CONFLICT(bucket_uid, card_uid) DO UPDATE SET
holder_id = excluded.holder_id,
holder_username = excluded.holder_username,
expires_at = excluded.expires_at
")->execute([
'b' => $bucketUid,
'c' => $cardUid,
'hid' => $clientTenant['id'],
'hu' => $clientTenant['username'],
]);
jsonResponse([
'ok' => true,
'holder_id' => (int)$clientTenant['id'],
'expires_at' => (string)$db->query("SELECT datetime('now', '+60 seconds')")->fetchColumn(),
]);
}
// ── DELETE: release own lock ─────────────────────────────────────
if (preg_match('#^/api/collab-locks/([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)/([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)$#', $route, $m) && $method === 'DELETE') {
if (!$clientTenant) jsonResponse(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
$bucketUid = $m[1];
$cardUid = $m[2];
$db->prepare('DELETE FROM collab_card_locks WHERE bucket_uid = :b AND card_uid = :c AND holder_id = :h')
->execute(['b' => $bucketUid, 'c' => $cardUid, 'h' => $clientTenant['id']]);
jsonResponse(['ok' => true]);
}
// ── GET: list locks visible to caller ────────────────────────────
if ($route === '/api/collab-locks' && $method === 'GET') {
if (!$clientTenant) jsonResponse(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
if (isRateLimited($db, 'collab-locks-get', 120)) jsonResponse(['error' => 'rate limited'], 429);
// Only return locks in buckets the caller is currently a member of,
// and only non-expired rows (bootstrap cleanup + defensive filter).
$stmt = $db->prepare("
SELECT l.bucket_uid, l.card_uid, l.holder_id, l.holder_username, l.acquired_at, l.expires_at
FROM collab_card_locks l
INNER JOIN collab_bucket_members m ON m.bucket_uid = l.bucket_uid
WHERE m.tenant_id = :tid
AND l.expires_at > datetime('now')
ORDER BY l.acquired_at DESC
");
$stmt->execute(['tid' => $clientTenant['id']]);
jsonResponse(['ok' => true, 'locks' => $stmt->fetchAll()]);
}