security: v2.0 — AES-GCM crypto, SSRF guards, rate limits, hardening
Breaking wire-format change: dual-read (V1+V2) / single-write (V2) so existing user secrets, stored messages, and inter-tenant key keep working. Old clients and relays lose cross-version chat until both sides are upgraded. Relay - Switch clientEncrypt/masterEncrypt to AES-256-GCM with HKDF-derived per-ciphertext salts; keep CBC-V1 fallback on decrypt only. - On-bootstrap migration re-envelopes tenant secret_encrypted and the inter-tenant key to GCM-V2 (idempotent). - CORS: stop reflecting arbitrary Origin; allow own origin + optional RELAY_CORS_ORIGINS env allowlist; drop Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. - Generic error messages replace "no such user: <name>" enumeration. - Exception messages no longer echoed back; logged server-side. - Collab-lock max hold capped at 10min so a member can't grief-refresh forever. - Attachment filenames validated against hex.<ext> pattern. - Passwords min length 10; /api/account/password rate-limited. App / Electron client - Shared hyprcrdRelayEncrypt/Decrypt helpers (GCM-V2 write, V1 read). - Chat + collab-buckets plugins delegate to the shared helpers. - Poll + push + attachments migrated to the dual-format path. - /api/relay/settings GET returns has_key boolean; secret never echoed. - Setup endpoint now CSRF-checked. - SSRF: CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS restricted to HTTP(S) everywhere; bookmarks favicon fetch also blocks private/loopback/link-local. - Login / password-change rate limiter moved to DB-backed IP keying. - Passwords min length 10 throughout. - Zip import enforces per-file (25MB) and total (500MB) caps, extension allowlist, no-overwrite. - Verbose relay-push debug gated behind APP_DEBUG env. Version bumped to 2.0.0 (protocol-breaking). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ if ($route === '/api/users' && $method === 'POST') {
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if (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{2,32}$/', $username)) {
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jsonResponse(['error' => 'username must be 2-32 chars: letters, digits, _ or -'], 400);
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}
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if (strlen($password) < 4) jsonResponse(['error' => 'password must be at least 4 chars'], 400);
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if (strlen($password) < 10) jsonResponse(['error' => 'password must be at least 10 chars'], 400);
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if (getTenantByUsername($db, $username)) jsonResponse(['error' => 'username already exists'], 409);
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// No client secret — the new user sets that themselves after first login
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@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ if (preg_match('#^/api/users/(\d+)$#', $route, $m) && $method === 'PATCH') {
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$input = json_decode(file_get_contents('php://input'), true) ?: [];
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$fields = []; $params = ['id' => $id];
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if (!empty($input['password'])) {
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if (strlen($input['password']) < 4) jsonResponse(['error' => 'password too short'], 400);
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if (strlen($input['password']) < 10) jsonResponse(['error' => 'password must be at least 10 chars'], 400);
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$fields[] = 'password_hash = :pw';
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$params['pw'] = password_hash($input['password'], PASSWORD_BCRYPT);
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}
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