security: v2.0 — AES-GCM crypto, SSRF guards, rate limits, hardening

Breaking wire-format change: dual-read (V1+V2) / single-write (V2) so
existing user secrets, stored messages, and inter-tenant key keep
working. Old clients and relays lose cross-version chat until both
sides are upgraded.

Relay
- Switch clientEncrypt/masterEncrypt to AES-256-GCM with HKDF-derived
  per-ciphertext salts; keep CBC-V1 fallback on decrypt only.
- On-bootstrap migration re-envelopes tenant secret_encrypted and the
  inter-tenant key to GCM-V2 (idempotent).
- CORS: stop reflecting arbitrary Origin; allow own origin + optional
  RELAY_CORS_ORIGINS env allowlist; drop Access-Control-Allow-Credentials.
- Generic error messages replace "no such user: <name>" enumeration.
- Exception messages no longer echoed back; logged server-side.
- Collab-lock max hold capped at 10min so a member can't grief-refresh
  forever.
- Attachment filenames validated against hex.<ext> pattern.
- Passwords min length 10; /api/account/password rate-limited.

App / Electron client
- Shared hyprcrdRelayEncrypt/Decrypt helpers (GCM-V2 write, V1 read).
- Chat + collab-buckets plugins delegate to the shared helpers.
- Poll + push + attachments migrated to the dual-format path.
- /api/relay/settings GET returns has_key boolean; secret never echoed.
- Setup endpoint now CSRF-checked.
- SSRF: CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS restricted to HTTP(S) everywhere; bookmarks
  favicon fetch also blocks private/loopback/link-local.
- Login / password-change rate limiter moved to DB-backed IP keying.
- Passwords min length 10 throughout.
- Zip import enforces per-file (25MB) and total (500MB) caps, extension
  allowlist, no-overwrite.
- Verbose relay-push debug gated behind APP_DEBUG env.

Version bumped to 2.0.0 (protocol-breaking).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
thandClaude Opus 4.7 committed 2026-04-17 17:02:04 +02:00
1 parent d50f9fe789
commit d83de30d6d
27 files changed
+473 -168

No files matched your search

+8 -16
View File
@@ -110,32 +110,24 @@
");
})();
/** Encrypt a JSON payload with the local relay_key using the same envelope
* format the rest of hyprcrd uses (HYPRCRD-RELAY-V1). */
/** Encrypt a JSON payload with the local relay_key using the shared
* dual-format envelope (GCM-V2 writes, V1 read-only fallback lives in
* hyprcrdRelayDecrypt). */
function collabEncryptPayload(array $fields): ?string {
$key = collabRelaySettings()['key'] ?? '';
if ($key === '') return null;
$encKey = substr(hash('sha256', $key), 0, 32);
$plain = json_encode($fields);
$iv = random_bytes(16);
$cipher = openssl_encrypt($plain, 'aes-256-cbc', $encKey, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, $iv);
if ($cipher === false) return null;
return "HYPRCRD-RELAY-V1\n" . base64_encode($iv . $cipher);
if ($plain === false) return null;
return hyprcrdRelayEncrypt($plain, $key);
}
/** Decrypt the inverse. Returns an associative array, or null on failure. */
function collabDecryptPayload(string $envelope): ?array {
if (!str_starts_with($envelope, 'HYPRCRD-RELAY-V1')) return null;
$b64 = trim(substr($envelope, strlen('HYPRCRD-RELAY-V1') + 1));
$raw = base64_decode($b64);
if (!$raw || strlen($raw) < 17) return null;
if (!str_starts_with($envelope, HYPRCRD_RELAY_GCM_MAGIC) && !str_starts_with($envelope, HYPRCRD_RELAY_CBC_MAGIC)) return null;
$key = collabRelaySettings()['key'] ?? '';
if ($key === '') return null;
$encKey = substr(hash('sha256', $key), 0, 32);
$iv = substr($raw, 0, 16);
$cipher = substr($raw, 16);
$plain = openssl_decrypt($cipher, 'aes-256-cbc', $encKey, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, $iv);
if ($plain === false) return null;
$plain = hyprcrdRelayDecrypt($envelope, $key);
if ($plain === '') return null;
$data = json_decode($plain, true);
return is_array($data) ? $data : null;
}