security: v2.0 — AES-GCM crypto, SSRF guards, rate limits, hardening
Breaking wire-format change: dual-read (V1+V2) / single-write (V2) so existing user secrets, stored messages, and inter-tenant key keep working. Old clients and relays lose cross-version chat until both sides are upgraded. Relay - Switch clientEncrypt/masterEncrypt to AES-256-GCM with HKDF-derived per-ciphertext salts; keep CBC-V1 fallback on decrypt only. - On-bootstrap migration re-envelopes tenant secret_encrypted and the inter-tenant key to GCM-V2 (idempotent). - CORS: stop reflecting arbitrary Origin; allow own origin + optional RELAY_CORS_ORIGINS env allowlist; drop Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. - Generic error messages replace "no such user: <name>" enumeration. - Exception messages no longer echoed back; logged server-side. - Collab-lock max hold capped at 10min so a member can't grief-refresh forever. - Attachment filenames validated against hex.<ext> pattern. - Passwords min length 10; /api/account/password rate-limited. App / Electron client - Shared hyprcrdRelayEncrypt/Decrypt helpers (GCM-V2 write, V1 read). - Chat + collab-buckets plugins delegate to the shared helpers. - Poll + push + attachments migrated to the dual-format path. - /api/relay/settings GET returns has_key boolean; secret never echoed. - Setup endpoint now CSRF-checked. - SSRF: CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS restricted to HTTP(S) everywhere; bookmarks favicon fetch also blocks private/loopback/link-local. - Login / password-change rate limiter moved to DB-backed IP keying. - Passwords min length 10 throughout. - Zip import enforces per-file (25MB) and total (500MB) caps, extension allowlist, no-overwrite. - Verbose relay-push debug gated behind APP_DEBUG env. Version bumped to 2.0.0 (protocol-breaking). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -110,32 +110,24 @@
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");
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})();
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/** Encrypt a JSON payload with the local relay_key using the same envelope
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* format the rest of hyprcrd uses (HYPRCRD-RELAY-V1). */
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/** Encrypt a JSON payload with the local relay_key using the shared
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* dual-format envelope (GCM-V2 writes, V1 read-only fallback lives in
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* hyprcrdRelayDecrypt). */
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function collabEncryptPayload(array $fields): ?string {
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$key = collabRelaySettings()['key'] ?? '';
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if ($key === '') return null;
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$encKey = substr(hash('sha256', $key), 0, 32);
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$plain = json_encode($fields);
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$iv = random_bytes(16);
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$cipher = openssl_encrypt($plain, 'aes-256-cbc', $encKey, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, $iv);
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if ($cipher === false) return null;
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return "HYPRCRD-RELAY-V1\n" . base64_encode($iv . $cipher);
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if ($plain === false) return null;
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return hyprcrdRelayEncrypt($plain, $key);
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}
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/** Decrypt the inverse. Returns an associative array, or null on failure. */
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function collabDecryptPayload(string $envelope): ?array {
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if (!str_starts_with($envelope, 'HYPRCRD-RELAY-V1')) return null;
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$b64 = trim(substr($envelope, strlen('HYPRCRD-RELAY-V1') + 1));
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$raw = base64_decode($b64);
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if (!$raw || strlen($raw) < 17) return null;
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if (!str_starts_with($envelope, HYPRCRD_RELAY_GCM_MAGIC) && !str_starts_with($envelope, HYPRCRD_RELAY_CBC_MAGIC)) return null;
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$key = collabRelaySettings()['key'] ?? '';
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if ($key === '') return null;
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$encKey = substr(hash('sha256', $key), 0, 32);
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$iv = substr($raw, 0, 16);
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$cipher = substr($raw, 16);
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$plain = openssl_decrypt($cipher, 'aes-256-cbc', $encKey, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, $iv);
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if ($plain === false) return null;
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$plain = hyprcrdRelayDecrypt($envelope, $key);
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if ($plain === '') return null;
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$data = json_decode($plain, true);
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return is_array($data) ? $data : null;
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}
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